By Steffen Huck (eds.)
This quantity comprises 16 unique articles documenting fresh growth in figuring out strategic behaviour. of their type they replicate a whole spectrum of coexisting methods: from orthodox online game conception through behavioural video game thought, bounded rationality and fiscal psychology to experimental economics. there are many new types and insights however the ebook additionally illustrates the limits of what we all know this day and explains the frontiers of the next day to come. The articles have been written in honour of Werner Güth.
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Extra info for Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality
28 Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh 29 do not match up especially well with everyday experience. One often sees vengeance when the discount factor is too small to support rational punishment (for example, in one-off encounters with strangers), and often the rational punishment fails to appear (for example, when a culprit apologizes sincerely). This chapter explores a different class of models. We consider repeated interactions in the context of small groups that enforce social norms. The norms are modelled not as traits of individual group members, but rather as traits of the group itself.
8 Then we have a free-rider problem with respect to group reputation. Each individual would benefit from using low in interactions outside the group, but the group’s reputation, and hence its members’ fitness, would suffer. The group must in some way regulate its members’ behaviour or things would unravel. We hypothesize that groups themselves possess traits that evolve to solve such problems. Note that social groups, unlike butterflies, use conscious mechanisms to control mimicry. Gangs may have secret handshakes and other codes of communication, but these are relevant only for identifying membership within the group.
1961) ‘Probability Learning in 1000 Trials’, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 385–94. Grant, D. , Hake, H. W. and Hornsety, J. P. (1951) ‘Acquisition and Extinction of a Verbal Conditioned Response with Differing Percentages of Reinforcement’, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 42, 1–5. , and Solan, E. (2003) ‘Randomization and Simplification in Dynamic Decision-making’, Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 251–64. Myers, J. L. (1976) ‘Probability Learning and Sequence Learning’, in W. K. ), Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes: Approaches to Human Learning and Motivation, Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum.